

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. Göttsch, Secretary of the SED Party Organization of Berlin-Treptow, spoke at a meeting on 17 August 1955, as follows:- 25X1

The speeches of Bulganin and Grotewohl on the German question have convinced the last doubter inside the Party that the reunification of Germany would never take place at the cost of the DDR. The Party thereby is in a position to depart from the defensive and to go over to a general offensive. Now, more than ever, gains made by the régime must be not only preserved but also extended to cover the whole of Germany. The Soviet Union had shown itself as a true and reliable friend, just as the Party leadership had described it. Whoever, therefore, still had any doubts as to the future attitude of the Soviet Union would be an enemy of the Soviets and the Party and would be immediately punished; there were no more such to be found in the ranks of the SED.

2. The most important task of the Party was to promote the slogan "Deutsche an einen Tisch!" On these grounds there would be a poll taken in the next few weeks in West Berlin in which West Berliners would be asked to give their opinion on the Geneva Conference, the Bulganin and Grotewohl speeches, and the reunification of Germany. Members of the BPO would carry out the poll in Gorkistrasse in Berlin-Reinickendorf. Action would be in groups of three. Two men would enter the house and ask the questions while a third would wait outside and take down a report of its success from the two questioners.
3. The leaders of the Party had often been asked in Party circles to emphasize the illegality of Adenauer's journey to Moscow and the fact that Adenauer did not possess the necessary powers to negotiate with the Soviets on the reunification of Germany. These critics obviously thought that the Party leaders were idiots. The latter, however, knew well enough that Adenauer has no authority, and in order to make this quite clear, the SED was recommending his journey to Moscow. Bulganin had assured Grotewohl that the Russians would negotiate with Adenauer solely over the resumption of diplomatic, economic, and cultural connections, which were also in the interests of the DDR. Talks about German reunification were out of the question. The Russians would destroy Adenauer's reputation as a great and successful statesman while he was in Moscow. They would show that Adenauer was the only hindrance to reunification and world-wide easing of tension".

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The "sly old fox in Bonn" had recognized the danger threatening him from Moscow and had tried to get out of making the journey through a number of excuses, but the freedom-loving population of West Germany had forced him to go. This population, which seeks friendship with the Soviet Union, had also caused the West German football team to go to Moscow although the professional warmongers in West Berlin had started a slanderous campaign against the journey. The people in East and West were ready for friendly relations. There was only a small clique in the West who had an interest in continuing the cold war. Their time had almost run out and the freedom-loving West German people would not elect Adenauer again.

4. As to the Kampfgruppen, Götsch said that it had been established that many comrades only took part in the exercises unwillingly and that they used all sorts of improbable excuses to get out of doing duty. The doctor who in the future would be responsible for medical certificates must reckon that if he gave any more of this kind he would be accused of sabotage of the defense programme.
5. At a 3-kilometer march of Group A to Berlin on 31 July 1955, there had been too many absentees. Because such a disgraceful attitude could in the last event lead to great danger, the members of Group A would be examined and untrustworthy elements excluded. Such people would of course never again enjoy the right to serve the State. The purging of the Kampfgruppen was an urgent necessity.

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